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One America?

 Presidential Appeals to Racial Resentment from LBJ to Trump

 

Nathan Angelo

 

Albany: State University of New York Press, 2020

(Paperback reissue, first published 2018)

xi+304 p. ISBN 978-1438471525. $26.95

 

Reviewed by Charles J. Holden

St. Mary’s College of Maryland

 

 

 

  

Political commentators, political scientists, historians continue to fill television and podcast airtime, newspaper opinion sections, and their Twitter feeds trying to make sense of the Donald Trump presidency. Nathan Angelo’s One America? contributes to the reckoning by asking the fundamental question: “How did we get here?” [xi]

A political scientist, Angelo examines the use of racial rhetoric by American presidents from Lyndon Johnson through Donald Trump. Part of Angelo’s methodology employs “quantitative content analysis” [7] to determine how often presidents referred to race in their public speeches. Angelo then digs in, using a “close textual analysis” [7] of the speeches. His textual analysis produces the most rewarding sections of his work. Angelo spends perhaps more time than is necessary explaining what he is going to do and explaining what other scholars have already done, but when he turns his analysis to the speeches themselves, the insights are many and well-founded.

While the main argument – that American presidents since the 1960s have aimed their messaging on racial matters at “White Middle Americans” [16] – will not come as a surprise to some readers, Angelo deftly traces the important differences along the way. Even Lyndon Johnson, he notes, seemingly at the height of his power following passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965, adjusted his public messaging to assuage White Middle Americans who feared that the federal government, at their expense, was doing too much to help the country’s long-marginalized populations. But, Angelo continues, it was Richard Nixon who set the tone for how many white Americans understood race relations and what the role the government should play in that relationship. It was primarily Nixon, with input from white nationalist speechwriters such as Pat Buchanan, who framed his public rhetoric on welfare around racially-coded images of welfare recipients as predominantly urban, the product of broken families, probably lazy, and potentially dangerous. Nixon then contrasted that image with references to “Americans” generally as hard-working, patriotic, tax-paying members of stable, two-parent families. Thus framed, Nixon did not need to add that by the latter he meant White Middle Americans.

Angelo shows how Nixon’s rhetoric set the lines of debate over welfare programs over the next five decades. To progressives, a successful welfare policy was one that received robust funding in order to lift up those who had unfairly been held down. To conservatives, a successful welfare policy was one that shrank in size by forcing the poor to “work” and “do their share” as a measure of their being “real” Americans. Either way the essentially racist subtext persisted. Subsequent presidents have not strayed – or been able to break out – from this pernicious framing, Democrats included. After the Ronald Reagan-led Republican Party began to shift even further to the right, a moderate Democrat like Bill Clinton positioned himself in the middle by pledging to “end welfare as we know it.” [138] Even Barack Obama, who spoke candidly about the tragic history of American race relations in other contexts, employed the hard work, good families, patriotic American trope as the primary goal of welfare reform.

Angelo also shows how Republican presidents, before Trump that is, were at least somewhat sensitive to the party becoming the home of white voters exclusively. Even putting the morality of such politics aside, in a country with an increasingly diverse population, this made poor political sense for the party, it seemed. Therefore from Nixon through George W. Bush, Republican presidents when discussing welfare expanded the narrative boundaries of acceptability beyond White Middle Americans to include “ethnics” in the late 1960s and Asian-Americans and Latinos by the early 2000s. While on the surface this seemed to contradict the Nixon era normalization of “white” as properly American, these demographic additions to the ranks of the acceptable were, if not traditionally “white,” also not black. Angelo’s makes his concluding point here convincingly. As long as this rhetorical framing remains, American welfare policy will always be constrained by the racist coding within the debate itself. And beyond policy debates the stakes are even higher: the “repetition” of this narrative, he concludes, “risks the perpetual construction of an American identity that is intimately connected to racial and ethnic resentment.” [196]

As Angelo notes in his first chapter, “rhetoric reinforces norms.” [6] This is certainly true and one could add that presidential rhetoric in particular can shape what become new norms. But even presidential rhetoric needs the support of an enabling media. Therefore one wishes that Angelo had given a bit more of a nod to the rise of right-wing media in the American market. The rise of the right-wing media aligns almost perfectly with Angelo’s timeline. Nixon, once again the trendsetter, with a big assist from his vice-president Spiro Agnew, strategically inserted into the public discourse the allegation that “the media” was liberal and therefore hostile to Republicans. This immediately became an article of faith on the Right and led to the cynical yet successful branding of FOX News later as “fair and balanced” despite its track record of programming that if not outright racist was, and is, certainly white supremacist-friendly, one might say.

Angelo concludes with an epilogue entitled simply “Trump,” thus taking readers back to the fundamental question of “How did we get here?” [xi]. Angelo at first answers his own question by asserting that Trump’s victory “fits nicely” [x] into his argument about appeals to White Middle Americans. In the epilogue he notes that Trump “did not stray far from any of the major norms or tactics used by Nixon” [202]. The epilogue also suggests some uncertainty, however. We find that “Trump is not really an exception, but his campaign may still reflect change in American political rhetoric” [202]. Later, Angelo again posits that “the Trump presidency is not normal, but his campaign may be more normal than we might assume at first glance” [214]. And Angelo also reminds us of Trump’s shocking (at the time) description of Mexicans as rapists and accusations of Muslim-Americans dancing on 9/11. That these appalling statements did not hurt him during the campaign, indeed they seemed to help, indicates that “Trump reflects a change in the Republican party” [214].

The “which is it?” tension within Angelo’s last chapter is understandable not solely because the book was going to press in the early stages of the Trump presidency, but because, I suspect, of the Trump movement itself. I can relate. Given that the hard cover version of One America? came out in 2018, one can assume that the manuscript was going through the final stages of publication in 2017 (the final chapter refers to Trump’s victory). I also had a (co-authored) book going through the publication process at this time. In Republican Populist : Spiro Agnew and the Origins of Donald Trump’s America, my co-authors Zach Messitte, Jerry Podair, and I found clear connections between Nixon vice president Spiro Agnew’s style of political attack and Trump’s. At the same time we could not shake the sense that Trumpism was something different. Now that a full-on white nationalist, anti-democratic, revanchist movement has taken ownership of the Republican Party, it seems so obvious. I cannot speak for Angelo, of course, but perhaps part of our hesitation in arriving at that conclusion sooner was us not wanting to believe the worst. But here we are. To be certain, Trumpism did not appear out of nowhere. One only has to look at the seemingly deliberate distortions and provocations of a mid-1990s Newt Gingrich to see its antecedents. But having now witnessed Trumpism in all its white nationalism, xenophobia, sexism, corruption, paranoia, and authoritarianism – and given the violent defiance of his supporters on January 6, 2021 – we are indeed living in different times.

 

 


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