WHAT PLACE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE LAND?

THE DECOLONISATION PROCESS IN AOTEAROA-NEW ZEALAND

Rognvald Leask
Université de Strasbourg

For non-Maori people, part of participation in [the] decolonisation process is about recognising their role as belonging to the dominant colonial grouping [Hutchings: Swaraj].

Historical background

New Zealand, situated in the South-west Pacific Ocean, over 2,150 kilometres east of Australia, became a British colony in 1840. Subsequent British immigration rapidly put the indigenous Maori population in a position of numerical inferiority, as the “settlers” established cities and swarmed over the land creating huge farms destined to supply the British market with meat, wool and dairy products. So New Zealand falls into a class of colony known as “settler colonies”, sharing characteristics with Australia and Canada in particular. But its extreme isolation, with Suva, Fiji, its nearest neighbour at about 2,100 km¹ to the North, favoured an original approach to the problems associated with decolonisation, as the indigenous Maori population sought over more than a century to re-establish its status as tangata whenua or the first people of the land.

Indeed, Maori were firmly established all over New Zealand in 1840. The currently-held theory is that this Polynesian people originated in South China and by 5000 B.C. had migrated through the Philippines to Papua-New Guinea. From there they continued east through the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, reaching Fiji and Tonga about 1500 B.C. The migration continued eastwards until it reached the Marquesas Islands around 500 B.C. From

¹ If we except the French territory of New Caledonia (about 1,810 km to the north-west).
there the ancestors of the Maori headed south-west, reaching Tahiti about 300 A.D., continuing to the Cook Islands and finally managing the long final voyage, still south-west, to begin to establish themselves in New Zealand around 1000 A.D. It is to be noted that these dates are approximate; they do, however, show the progress of these peoples from West to East, and then back down to New Zealand [HIMONA]. Thus when the first Europeans sighted New Zealand, Maori were living throughout the country and organised into tribes, each claiming authority over a particular region.

These first Europeans were the members of an expedition under the command of Dutch explorer Abel Tasman, who sighted and sailed along a part of the coastline in 1642, before leaving without setting foot on land. He mapped a part of the western coastline of the country.

It was left to the British navigator James Cook to circumnavigate and entirely map New Zealand in 1769-70. Publication of the records of his three voyages to the country awakened European interest in the new land. The presence of French explorers in the region was also considerable, with expeditions among which we can cite those of De Surville (in 1769, the same year as Cook), the unfortunate Du Fresne (1772), killed after violating the tapu (sacred and forbidden nature) of a small bay, and D’Entrecasteaux (1793) [MEIN SMITH : 28].

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century saw increasingly frequent visits by European and American sealing and whaling boats which exploited the rich resources of the Southern Ocean. They established bases along the coast of New Zealand and had frequent interactions with local Maori. Maori also began making contact with the wider world through visits to Sydney on trading, sealing or whaling boats.

The other significant Europeans who began making contact and working with Maori were the missionaries [LINEHAM : Te Ara]. It was Samuel Marsden, of the Anglican Church Missionary Society who preached the first sermon to Maori in the Bay of Islands on Christmas Day 1814. Their status as protectors of Marsden’s mission enabled the Nga Puhi chiefs of the Bay of Islands to do commerce with British settlers in Australia. In this way, the English language, European-style agriculture, gardening and carpentry began to be introduced into New Zealand. The chiefs, notably the famous Hongi Heka also entered into a profitable business by buying and trading
the muskets that were to destabilize tribal relations throughout New Zealand in the following decades [MEIN SMITH : 32]. The Church of England and the Wesleyans had competition from the French Roman Catholic church, personified by Bishop Pompallier, who established his first mission in the Bay of Islands; he was present at the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, although regarded with suspicion by the British. Pompallier also established the very effective order of the Congregation of the Holy Family. One of the founding sisters of this order, Mother Marie Joseph Aubert (‘Meri’ to the locals) did much good work among both Maori and Pakeha from the 1860s until her death in 1926 after over sixty years of service to the people of New Zealand [TENNANT : Te Ara].

**Political Decolonisation**

After this very brief history of early contact, we turn to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, the act which established New Zealand as a British colony. Curiously, and this is a feature of other settler-type colonies too, from the moment of this official gesture, New Zealand’s history became one of colonisation and decolonisation, the two advancing almost simultaneously. In the rest of this paper we will try to understand this phenomenon.

It is not the object of the paper to discuss in detail all the ramifications of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi on 6 February 1840. However it was this document, in British eyes at least, which gave legitimacy to the colonisation of Aotearoa-New Zealand. The Treaty remains controversial even today, firstly because of divergent understanding between British and Maori as to the meaning of the document that was signed\(^1\), and secondly because of the frequent breaches of the protective clauses of the Treaty by colonising companies and the government itself, which, for example, bought up 34 million acres of Ngai Tahu land\(^2\) (most of the South Island) for a fraction of one penny per acre. It made a nice profit on the resell to prospective farmers! We will see later the importance that the Treaty of Waitangi has had in both the economic and cultural decolonisations of Aotearoa-New Zealand.

---

\(^1\) There are significant problems with the interpretation of key words, between the Maori version and the English one.

\(^2\) That is, 137,594 square kilometres, or one quarter of the total area of France.
New Zealand’s colonial and postcolonial history is marked notably by the rapid influx of white settlers of European, largely British, origin, destined to live permanently in the country. After the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, which in British eyes gave respectability to colonisation, the white settlers rapidly engulfed the Maori and set about the task of building a “Better Britain” in the Antipodes. As can be seen from the following brief outline, the settlers wasted no time in re-creating a society of British institutions and practices. They also constructed towns, roads and railways, began building schools, churches, government buildings, destroyed forests to establish arms in their place, created small and medium-sized industrial start-ups, and started playing rugby and cricket. By 1854, the colony had its own democratically-elected parliament, very much in advance in that the vote was accorded to all adult males on the basis of property ownership, but open to Pakeha and Maori. Property ownership being a concept alien to the Maori, very few would have qualified; so in 1867 the government granted the suffrage to all adult Maori males. Thus the Maori had universal adult male suffrage twelve years before the Pakeha, who caught up only in 1879 when the suffrage was made universal for all male citizens. Fourteen years later, New Zealand also pioneered universal adult suffrage, as all adult women (Pakeha and Maori) gained the right to vote in 1893 [ELECTIONS NEW ZEALAND: The Right to Vote]. In terms of voting rights at least, the Treaty of Waitangi, which guaranteed equality of rights between British and Maori, was thus respected. I believe that this early introduction of Maori into the political system, even if it was alien to them, was a significant factor in their revival, which we will discuss at more length shortly.

With an established government rapidly set in place, the settlers found themselves in a curious position with regard to the “mother country”, that is, Britain. In fact, it is possible to say that as soon as they started colonising the country, they were already working towards independence, in other words, towards political decolonisation. Indeed, only fourteen years after the signing of the Treaty at Waitangi, in the extreme North of the North Island, a central national government was installed with responsibility for the entire country (which, incidentally, is slightly larger than the United Kingdom in surface area). Parliament was based on the Westminster model, with an Upper and a Lower Chamber. At the same time 10 provincial governments were established. However, as this system rapidly became cumbersome it was generally seen by New Zealanders to be unnecessary. Thus in 1876, the provincial governments were abolished.
With the arrival in power of the Liberal government in 1892, a considerable amount of advanced social and democratic legislation was passed within the year:

- The Crown Lands Act permitted the acquisition of Crown land by small farmers.
- Factory and retail workers were protected by the Factories Act and the Shop and Shop Assistants Act.
- A Ministry of Labour was created.
- Prime Minister Ballance limited the power of the Governor by forcing him to accept the advice of the New Zealand government.

Then in 1894, the Government Advances to Settlers Act permitted small farmers to borrow from the government under favourable conditions. In 1898 retiring workers received a pension from the government with the passing of the Old Age Pensions Act. This radical legislation, well in advance of what was happening in Britain at the same time, demonstrates an independence of political thinking and a willingness to create innovative laws appropriate for New Zealand. So we can see that decolonisation in this sense meant basically the independence of the colonisers from the mother country. They were busy creating a better mother country and didn’t want too much interference from London.

Thus when Britain granted Dominion status to New Zealand in 1907, the colony was more than ready, having been politically autonomous for half a century. Yet at the same time, they were content to stay within the Empire, enjoying the advantages of security guaranteed by the British Navy in particular, and the economic security of a protected market for all the produce that their burgeoning agricultural and pastoral industries could produce, especially after the development of refrigerated ships to transport New Zealand meat and dairy produce half way around the world. In 1882, the first such voyage had been made by the Dunedin, from Port Chalmers, the port of Dunedin, to London.

The Statute of Westminster, passed by the British government in 1931, declared the Dominions to be members of the British Commonwealth, equal with each other and with Britain. The New Zealand government, content with the status quo, waited until after the Second World War to ratify this
statute, in 1947, the date on which it can be said that New Zealand became effectively independent from the mother country. However, it took the New Zealand Constitution Act of 1986 to remove the last vestige of prerogative from the British Parliament (the ability to legislate for New Zealand with the agreement of the New Zealand parliament).

**Economic Decolonisation**

Refrigeration tightened New Zealand’s links with Britain, and the colony’s economy became focused on the export of meat and dairy products. The success of the industrialisation of its agriculture resulted in New Zealanders’ living standards rising to the third highest in the world, and remaining there until the early 1950s. It was not until after World War II that New Zealand slowly began to realise that it must broaden its economic base and develop export products for the rapidly globalising world. In this respect, we can say that economic decolonisation occurred considerably later than the political version.

What really broke New Zealand out of its colonial economic immobility was the shock of Britain’s entry into the European Common Market in 1973. The country woke up to the fact that its privileged, protected, colonial economy now had to sink or swim by itself on the world market. The structural changes came rapidly and are still continuing. One illustration should suffice to show the evolution of New Zealand’s dependency on the British market. At the beginning of our period of study, 1918, 63.98% of New Zealand’s exports went to Britain; in 1947, the year of New Zealand’s ratification of the Statute of Westminster, the figure had even risen to 76.26%. However, at the end of our period, in 1984, the figure had crashed to 10.28%, and New Zealand’s market had widened greatly. Australia (15.9%) and Japan (15.2%) were New Zealand’s biggest markets, but the country was exporting a greatly diversified range of products to a considerable number of countries around the world1.

---

1 These figures come from the New Zealand Government’s agency known as New Zealand Trade and Enterprise. For interest, the figures for 2010 show the continuation of this trend, with Australia being New Zealand’s biggest market (23.75%), while Britain’s share was only 3.85%. New Zealand now exports to a very wide range of countries around the globalised world.
Maori and the Decolonisation Process

Aotearoa-New Zealand is one of a group of countries known as “settler societies” which form a significant sub-class in study of decolonisation. Indeed, in the political phase, as has been noted, decolonisation meant the freeing of largely British colonists from the control of Britain while maintaining the most cordial relations with the mother country. Both mother and daughter benefitted from preferential trading arrangements. Only the rights and welfare of the indigenous populations were ignored in the calculation.

Settler colonies were typified by massive immigration from the colonising nation, rapidly swamping the indigenous populations, resulting in the alienation of their lands, the de-structuring of their society and the devaluing of their culture, including their language. Because the settlers created a replica of Great Britain, from the Maori point of view the movement towards independence did nothing to alter their situation. They were still the colonised, but they were colonised by the colonists; emancipated from British control, they were still living in a society imposed by British people, who had been since the early days of colonisation the most numerous people in the land. Thus Maori found themselves living in the land of their ancestors, but forced to get by as an insignificant minority in a society which was alien to them, finding themselves near the bottom of all the indicators that sociologists and others use to evaluate the success of their society. Decimated by resistance warfare, in which, by the way, they did considerable damage to both British and colonial armies in spite of small numbers and a huge military-technological disadvantage, weakened by deadly imported diseases to which they had no resistance and demoralised by the imposition of alien cultural practices to the detriment of their own, their numbers went into decline. Their population in 1840 has been estimated at around 100,000, while there were probably only about 2,000 Pakeha in the new colony. However the census of 1896 revealed a complete reversal: the non-Maori population had exploded to just over 701,000, while the Maori population had collapsed to around 42,000, many observers considering them to be a dying race [MEIN SMITH : 78].

1 Others include Australia, Canada and South Africa.
We can see then that the conception of decolonisation as simply the gaining of political or economic independence by a colonised territory falls well short of embracing all the questions posed by this process, and I wish to dedicate the major part of this paper to what I have termed cultural decolonisation. This defence of their cultural integrity, the longest and hardest battle that Maori have had to face, has been aptly named by Maori academic Dr Ranginui Walker, in his book on the subject, which he entitled *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou – Struggle without End*.

In this section I lean heavily on the accounts of this struggle written by major New Zealand historians. The intention is to demonstrate that in the former settler colonies in particular, the destruction caused by colonisation on indigenous society was widespread, permanent and unacknowledged. The struggle of Maori has been to affirm their culture and their own social organisation, and to position them alongside those of Pakeha as equal partners, a right which was granted to their ancestors who in 1840 signed the Treaty of Waitangi. This long, hard and continuing struggle finds its echo in similar struggles by indigenous populations in Australia, Canada and the United States, amongst others. Closely watched in more recent times by United Nations organisations as well as others concerned with the plight of indigenous peoples, Aotearoa-New Zealand has staggered towards the Kiwi vision of a bicultural society, but only as the result of continuous effort by Maori themselves, working on all fronts, to change attitudes, particularly those of the Pakeha majority.

The terms of the Treaty were breached repeatedly from the start as massive immigration from Britain got under way after its signature. By the beginning of our period (1919) Maori had been dispossessed of most of their land in order to make way for the new land-hungry immigrants. Sometimes the land was alienated by forced sale at a ridiculously low cost, sometimes it was taken by force (there were Land Wars in the 1840s and again in the

1 Pakeha are New Zealanders of European descent.
2 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation (UNSCD), for example. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was endorsed, a little tardily, by New Zealand in 2010.
3 Bilingual place-naming is becoming more and more the norm in current New Zealand society.
1860s as the Maori tried to stop the occupation of their tribal lands), or sometimes it was treated as *terra nullius* and occupied by “squatters”. Furthermore, the Treaty specifically guaranteed the protection of all the rights of Maori, and that was certainly understood by Maori to mean their right to organise themselves and live according to their own customs, possessing the same rights as the British settlers. However, these settlers showed little interest for the Treaty, apart from the fact that it appeared to give a legal framework to their occupation of the land. Maori, appalled at the alienation of their land, which resulted also in the breakdown of their communities, clung to their belief that they could appeal to the government or to the Queen in order to win justice. By 1919, they knew already that they would have to struggle. The publication of important documents relating to the Treaty in 1922 sparked a revival of interest, and discussion on the marae\(^1\) was lively. After considerable effort, as would be the case with each claim, concessions were made to the Arawa and Ngati Tuwharetoa tribes concerning their fishing rights.

Some Maori did gain from their political and other rights and were to become strong leaders in the Maori Renaissance which was under way. Apirana Ngata, Maui Pomare and Te Rangihiroa (Peter Buck), all became Members of Parliament and government ministers for various lengths of time between 1905 and 1943. The case of Apirana Ngata will suffice to demonstrate how strong Maori leaders were able to begin the process of the reconstruction of Maori self-esteem.

While Ngata believed that Maori should learn to survive and to succeed in the Pakeha system, he also was determined that his own culture must be supported in order that it should flourish again and give strength to his people. For him, the marae would be the basis of the cultural renaissance. He set about actively encouraging the construction, reconstruction or renovation of *wharepuni*, the highly decorated houses that were the focal point of any Maori community. In so doing he encouraged the training of young carvers and specialists of the other arts and crafts necessary for the construction, decoration and preservation of the history of the community. In parallel, in 1922, Te Puea Herangi, one of the most notable women in

\(^1\) Marae: courtyard – the open area in front of the *wharenui* [meeting house], where formal greetings and discussions take place. Often also used to include the complex of buildings around the marae [MOORFIELD: marae].
post-contact Maori history, inspired the construction of the carved *wharepuni* on the Turangawaewae Marae in Ngaruawahia in the Waikato province. This is a focal point of Maoridom nationwide, as it is the base of the Kingitanga or Maori King movement. (New Zealand is thus a double constitutional monarchy). This Maori-centred activity was a first stimulus to the revival, but Ngata had many other plans in his “fight for equity” [Walker: 191]. He was active in Treaty claims concerning Maori land and water rights. He campaigned for the nomination of a Maori Anglican bishop for New Zealand, and this church named the first one in 1928; he encouraged Maori literature by collecting songs and tales from all over the country; he promoted the teaching of the Maori language while encouraging young Maori to master English in order to survive in the greater New Zealand society. During the Second World War he oversaw the creation of the now famous 28th (Maori) Battalion, which distinguished itself notably in North Africa and in Italy, thus uplifting Maori *mana* (prestige). In 1939 he set up the Young Maori Conference at Auckland University, thus ensuring a new generation of leaders, although many never returned from service in the war. Of those who did return, many entered the Maori Affairs department or the education system, working for the benefit of their people. For the pragmatic Ngata, “there was no questioning the sovereign rights assumed by the government; the challenge was to make that power work for the advancement of the Maori people” [Orange: 228].

1918 had also seen the birth of the Ratana Movement which was to have a powerful influence on both Maori religion and on New Zealand politics. A self-declared prophet, Ratana founded a fundamentally Christian church for Maori and a political movement which pressed the government to act on Treaty of Waitangi claims and on many other Maori concerns. In 1922, Ratana led a delegation to King George V of England concerning breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, but he was blocked by the New Zealand High Commissioner and never gained his audience. Henceforth he concentrated on politics in New Zealand. After an interview in 1935 with the new Labour Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage, Ratana threw the weight of his movement behind the Labour Party, ensuring for it the four Maori seats in Parliament until 1979. Moving away from traditional tribal structures, these new ones such as Ratana, the Young Maori Party and others to follow were pan-Maori in character, giving Maori a much stronger base and a louder voice on the political stage.
The considerable Māori effort during the Second World War certainly won the respect of all New Zealanders. Not only the soldiers of the Māori Battalion, but also the energetic activities of the Māori War Effort Organisation at home showed that Māori were fully implicated in the destiny of the country. The MWEO was seen as an example of the kind of parallel society that Māori were defending at the time, as it worked alongside government organisations while being structured in a Māori way. This was a happy example of the co-operative autonomy which Māori were advocating. What a disillusion when after the war this structure was integrated, first into the Department of Māori Affairs and later into a hierarchical Pākehā-style structure known as the Māori Council, which will be discussed below. Māori saw their own culture, their own way of doing things, in spite of the fact that it had proved itself, undervalued by the high-handed reorganisation of this new structure. And when the Young Māori Party soldiers returned from the war, they believed that they had earned the right to equality. “Unlike their predecessors, […] they had seen the Māori language and culture survive into the second half of the twentieth century and they were impatient with anything less than full equality with Pākehā citizens” [King: 480].

After World War II, the transformation of Māori society, both voluntary and involuntary, accelerated. According to Walker, before the war, 90% of the Māori population had been rural; by 1951, that figure was 19%. [Walker: 197-198] No longer able to earn a living from the small farms that remained to them, Māori were forced to drift to the cities, and especially Auckland, in order to find work. They were thus cut off from their traditional base and had to face life in the Pākehā cities, adapting as best they could to the world of rents and mortgages, rates and credit. To avoid complete assimilation, Māori needed support to maintain a “cultural continuity” [Walker: 199]. This was assured by numerous voluntary associations, by the churches, by sports clubs, culture clubs, Māori Wardens, Māori councils and the Māori Women’s Welfare League. A new form of urban marae developed, embracing all Māori regardless of tribal affiliations.

In the fight against Pākehā domination, Māori women were to the fore. The very influential Māori Women’s Welfare League was established in 1951. Under the direction of a woman who was to have an enormous influence in the latter half of the twentieth century, Whina Cooper, the League branches around the country became forums for the expression of Māori views on
housing, health, education, welfare, crime and discrimination in housing and employment. It was able to mount considerable pressure on successive governments on all these points.

The Government itself established a Maori Council in 1962 in order to make the Maori voice better heard. However, this council, set up in a very Pakeha fashion, did not win full support from Maori, especially as the government often enacted legislation against the recommendations of the Council. Nevertheless, faced with rising urban problems of educational failure, juvenile delinquency and a rising crime rate, the Council did organise an important Young Maori Leaders Conference at Auckland University in 1939. The conference, which permitted interchange among elders, delegates from important Maori organisations as well as students and gang members, came up with numerous recommendations which formed a useful plan for a way ahead, focussing in particular on “conserving Maori language and culture, providing assistance to Maori in making adjustment to urban life, educating the Pakeha to become culturally sensitive, and social transformation towards a more equitable relationship between Maori and Pakeha” [WALKER : 208]. Mistrusting the government’s will or ability to implement the recommendations, the young people set up their own action group, Nga Tamatoa, the young warriors. One consequence of the activism of this group, combined with strong advice to the government from the Maori Council, was the important Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975, whose principle purpose was to set up a tribunal which had the role of hearing contemporary cases of Maori grievance against breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and to make recommendations to Parliament, which retained the power to settle the disputes. As Treaty of Waitangi researcher Janine Hayward points out in her entry in Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand, the Act established the principle that the Treaty “signified a partnership between Pakeha and Maori requiring each to act towards the other reasonably and with the utmost good faith” [HAYWARD : Te Ara]. At the same time, during the 1970s, demands increased for a full national holiday to commemorate the Treaty of Waitangi and especially for parliamentary ratification of the Treaty. During the 1960s, television coverage had brought the ceremony into the homes of nearly all New Zealanders, generating renewed interest and debate. Widespread decolonisation in Asia, Africa and the Pacific, Black power activism in the United States, Native American advances in having similar treaties recognised by governments, reinforced the Maori position in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi. They also demanded increasing Pakeha awareness and
acceptance of Maoritanga (Maori culture in all its manifestations). Submissions by the New Zealand Maori Council and the New Zealand Maori Women’s League had highlighted glaring social inequality that had remained invisible for too long. In the latter part of the decade, the newly-established Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal became ever more assured and more active, although once again organised in a distinctly Pakeha way, notably in the adoption of the adversary system for the hearing of presentations, rather than the consensual approach preferred by Maori.

There was little that was consensual, however, in the Bastion Point occupation of 1977-78. An attempted subdivision of disputed land at Bastion Point in Auckland led to the occupation of the site by protesters united under the Banner of the Orakei Maori Action Group. The history of this land is one of confiscation in contradiction to the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. After 506 days of occupation, the protesters were finally dislodged by a large contingent of police and army personnel. The group lost the battle but won the war, as ten years later the government made a formal apology and returned the land to the Ngati Whatua tribe with compensation. Concluding his passage on the incident, Walker feels this episode shows

that the Maori is not intimidated by power, just as the fighters of a warrior race were not intimidated by the big guns at Orakau or Gate Pa. The indomitable desire of the human spirit for freedom and justice cannot be denied by repression. That was the underlying message of Rewi Maniapoto: the struggle will go on forever. [WALKER : 219]

And so it did. In 1984 a hikoi or protest march to Waitangi protested at the “celebration” of Waitangi day, as the marchers claimed that it should be seen more as a day of mourning for the loss of millions of hectares of Maori land. The immediate success met with a mixed reaction, but it did lead to a nationwide hui [meeting] held at Turangawaewae, Ngaruawahia, and a second, government-assisted one at Waitangi the following year. The status of the Treaty was confirmed and the challenge was thrown down to the government to find ways of satisfying all interested parties.

Another very positive step was made with the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment of 1985. This act permitted proceedings to occur in a more informal manner. It also decided that any claim dating from 1840 on was eligible to be heard. The Tribunal now had the responsibility of
investigating the claims with the aid of research teams. Since this time, although the process can be frustratingly slow, the Tribunal has gained considerably in mana [respect] as an arbitrator, and even government now takes a big political and judicial risk if it tries to get around the Tribunal's decisions.

A final controversial step, at the limit of the scope of this paper, was taken in 1986 with the passing of the State-owned Enterprises Act, which converted a certain number of government departments into state-owned companies. This involved transferring assets, including Crown land alienated from the Maori during the colonial period. For the first time, account was to be taken of possible claims before the Waitangi Tribunal as a result of these transfers. A clause from this Act has virtually become jurisprudence: “Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi” [ORANGE : 254].

**Towards a Bi-cultural Aotearoa-New Zealand?**

Right throughout this story, each step in the progress towards the recognition of the right of the first inhabitants of Aotearoa New Zealand to live in accordance with their own customs and in an equal partnership with the Pakeha has been earned after long and painful discussions, disputes, rejections, re-starts, repressions, violence, and enormous expenditure of energy. The progress towards the removal of the last traits of colonialism from New Zealand society was steady throughout our period, and has continued in a promising manner since the 1980s up to the present day, as this paragraph from a very recent article on Pakeha decolonisation practice would seem to suggest:

> The hegemony of the ‘benign colonisation’ notion of 1960s New Zealand forced Maori protest and critique. By 2000, the praxis of Treaty education had helped facilitate the discourse and practices of ‘honouring the Treaty’ in the public, social service and professional sectors. Without the past four decades of decolonisation practice by Pakeha and other non-indigenous educators, the Maori focus on Te Tiriti would have remained incomprehensible to most Pakeha. In my interpretation, antiracism and Treaty education helped create alternative outlooks and practices towards a decolonised future. [HUYGENS : 73]
In this paper I have tried to show, through the use of examples taken from one nation, the fact that decolonisation occurs in all sectors of a nation’s life, that within the same country the different forms of decolonisation do not necessarily progress at the same rhythm and, in particular, that the elimination of colonial practices depends on the elimination of the dominator-dominated couple, of racism and on their replacement by universally-agreed principles of equality and equity.

The New Zealand experience has demonstrated how the colonised Maori undertook a long “struggle [seemingly] without end” to regain recognition and due respect in New Zealand, a struggle which was beginning to show results but which was still far from finished by the end of the period under study. What was necessary to complete the process was a realisation by the Pakeha majority of their responsibilities in the process. Robert Consedine, a Pakeha and a dedicated and experienced Treaty of Waitangi educator, explains this necessity in the following terms:

> It is in the process of rediscovering our own roots that Pakeha people can move towards an authentic relationship with the indigenous world, based on shared values of relationship to the land and to the human spirit. [...] If indigenous peoples are going to develop, majority cultures have to change. This is our challenge. [Consedine: 172]

Many things have happened in New Zealand since 1984 which give cause for optimism that Pakeha are coming to terms with their history and are learning to work alongside an increasingly confident Maori population in a partnership which is taking New Zealanders once and for all out of the unhealthy and unsustainable colonial relationship, permitting them to share a new model of society and a new people who share a common and unique culture. The reconstruction plan for the city of Christchurch after the violent series of earthquakes of 2010-2011, into which Ngai Tahu, the local Maori iwi [tribe], has had considerable input, is an encouraging demonstration of how settler and indigenous history and cultural values can each contribute to a new blended, genuinely post-colonial society [Christchurch City Council].

But that is the subject of another article.
Bibliography

NB. All websites were last consulted in December 2012.


